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Should SPH Shareholders take Umbrage at the Proposed Restructuring?




Imagine you are running a company that has multiple lines of businesses. Most of your businesses are doing well, except for your restaurant business that has seen declining profitability. Due to changing consumer preferences, your restaurant has seen falling revenues over the past decade, but was still profitable all along. Recently, due to Covid-19, your restaurant has recorded its first-ever loss in FY2020.

Now, because you believe that your restaurant would continue to make losses in the future, you want to get rid of your restaurant business. You look around for potential buyers/takers, and I offer to take over your failing restaurant business.

What would be a fair price for this business?

Suppose I told you – firstly, you will had over your business to me. Additionally, I want you to give me $80 million in cash and $30 million in shares of your company and your subsidiary. I also want you to give me two buildings – the building that your restaurant operates in, and also the corporate office of your restaurant, worth a combined $147 million. All in, you have to give me around $250 million to take over your failing restaurant business.

What would you say?

You’d probably wonder why I’d even propose such a deal. You might even think I’m crazy.

But that’s the deal on the table for SPH shareholders as part of the restructuring exercise. Talk about taking umbrage!

The Public Reaction

When I first watched the clip of the CEO’s heated response to the journalist, I honestly found it hilarious. How dare you! But I did not expect this to blow up into such a sensational issue. A lot has been said about the competency of having retired generals taking up roles in the private sector. My view is that it all boils down to corporate experience and culture.

Take the example of Mr Chew Shouzi, the Singaporean who recently took over as the CEO of TikTok. Similar to our public sector scholars, Mr Chew has stellar academic credentials, earning his undergraduate degree at UCL, followed by a Havard MBA. Subsequently, his career path included a stint at Goldman Sachs as an investment banker in the Technology, Media & Telecommunications sector, followed by making partner at a leading Tech-focused venture capital fund. During his tenure as the CFO of Xiaomi, he led their IPO process in Hong Kong. In his most recent role, he was the CFO of ByteDance (Tik Tok’s parent company) before assuming the role of TikTok CEO. All round relevant experience in the Tech and Media sector.

Now, if you could choose, what profile would you pick to be the CEO of SPH?

On the point of culture, in organisations where seniority takes absolute precedence, individuals in senor positions may be blindsided by issues on the ground, especially if their subordinates constantly seek to paint the best picture. Over time, one may be entrenched in such systems, and may find it difficult to adapt to roles which require innovation in competitive industries.

This is a systemic issue, and I came across an excellent article on Quora which discusses the issue.

https://www.quora.com/Do-you-think-an-overhaul-is-needed-in-the-Singapore-civil-service-in-how-we-select-our-leaders-government-scholarship

What’s Next for Shareholders?

Shareholders would have to vote on the proposed restructuring sometime in July/August 2021. Since it is and EGM, it probably requires the approval of 75% of shareholders for the restructuring to proceed. I spoke to an SPH shareholder, who somehow seems to think that the deal would definitely go through, as there are substantial shareholders who would definitely support the deal. However, this is not true, as under the Newspaper and Printing Press Act, nobody can become a substantial shareholder of SPH without the approval of the Minister. Hence, no shareholder controls more than 5% of SPH shares, and 99.9% of SPH shares are held by the public, as per its 2020 Annual Report.

I think some shareholders may have been confused with the management shares class that SPH issues. Basically, the management shares only have greater voting power (200 votes per share vs 1 vote per share for ordinary share) when it comes to issues such as appointing or dismissing directors or any member of the staff of the company. In all other situations, ordinary shares are entitled to the same voting rights (1 vote per share) as the management shares. Currently, there are 16.3 million management shares, compared to 609.3 million ordinary shares. Hence, the voting power during the EGM on the proposed restructuring lies in the hands of each and every SPH shareholder.

What are the potential scenarios?

1. As per the analogy described above, shareholders decide that the best choice would be to give away c.250 million in cash and kind, to get rid of the underperforming media business. The proposed restructuring gets approved.

2. Shareholders decide that giving away c.250 million to dispose the underperforming asset is ridiculous. Shareholders request that the management seek a better deal for them. Ideally, the CLG is seeded with cash from “private and public sources” first, which then buys over the media business from SPH on a willing buyer, willing seller basis. For a reference, Alibaba acquired the South China Morning Post for $266 million USD in December 2015, in an all cash deal. Alternatively, variations of the financial terms of the deal could be negotiated, for example, SPH pays less than $80 million, or SPH does not transfer SPH News Centre and Print Centre (worth a combined $147 million) but instead rents the building to the CLG, and continue to collect rental income. Finally, sometime down the road, the financial aspects of the become more acceptable to SPH shareholders, and they approve of the transaction.

3. The proposed restructuring is not approved by Shareholders, and SPH Media remains part of SPH for the foreseeable future. SPH Media is *expected* to make losses over the next few years. Do note that SPH Media has always been profitable pre-pandemic, and only recorded its first loss ever due to Covid-19. What I find interesting is that for companies that have always been making losses (Grab, WeWork etc), they always project some improvement to profitability in the future, no matter how far-fetched it may sound to some. Now, we’re seeing the exact opposite, where a business segment that has always been profitable, is expected to “incur losses and widen” over the next few years. My point being – what really happens in the future is really anyone’s guess.

Conclusion

Much of the debate has been around the issues of editorial integrity, advertiser interests, quality of journalism and the like, but the decision the SPH shareholders face is essentially a financial one. However, if we were to see SPH Media from the perspective of serving as a “public good”, as the provider of news and information to the public, then the issue becomes about who should bear the cost of providing public goods? Should it be the taxpayers, in the form of Government financing, or should it be the SPH shareholders (who are most likely taxpayers themselves too), who have already seen the value of the investments declined so drastically, and yet are expected fork out an additional $250 million? Tellingly, the SPH shareholder is the one with the power to decide, not the taxpayers.

There are definitely no easy answers, but I’m sure we would all be watching closely on how this plays out.

Disclaimer: This article is intended for informational and discussion purposes only, and do not constitute financial advice. When in doubt, please contact a licensed financial adviser.

Note: As of writing, I do not have a position in SPH. However, my positions may change from time to time without further any updates to this post. 

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Thoughts on Capitaland's Restructuring (SGX:C31)


 

Capitaland (“CAPL”) announced that it would undertake a restructuring exercise, splitting its development arm from its investment management arm. Its development arm would be taken private, while its investment management arm would remain listed as Capitaland Investment Management (“CLIM”). This post would summarise my thoughts on this restructuring exercise, as well as my take on how we should value CLIM going forward.

My general take on this deal is that it is the right strategy for CAPL to restructure its business. Property development is exposed to market cycles, regulatory action and other factors, whereas the investment management arm can expect to see more stable recurring revenues in the form of management fees and dividends from its stake in the various Reits.

In fact, in early 2020, I invested in Frasers Property for a similar reason, as my thesis back then was that investing in a developer with a substantial portfolio of Reits under management would be more lucrative than investing in the Reits themselves. If we were to simply compare a Reit against the investment management company that manages the Reit (assuming a pure IM company without the development arm), it would appear that the IM company should be the better investment, because its profits would include management fees + dividends from its proportionate stake in the Reits, whereas an investor in the Reit would only be receiving dividends. While that investment has not turned out well for me, CAPL’s proposed restructuring would allow investors to better value the REIM and Development arms separately, which ideally would fetch higher valuations as compared to a single entity.  

Transaction Structure

Shareholders in CAPL would receive a total consideration of $4.102 per share, which includes 1 CLIM share valued at $2.823, 0.155 CICT units and $0.951 in cash. On a diluted basis, assuming all convertible bonds are exercised, the total consideration drops to $3.969.



As part of the consideration, 388 million CICT shares will be distributed – representing around 6% of CICT’s total units issued. Post restructuring, CLIM’s stake in CICT would be pared down from c.29% to c.23%.

Overview of CLIM

Post restructuring, CLIM would have a NAV of $14.8B. The breakdown of the NAV includes CLIM’s stakes in the 6 Reits/Business Trusts (worth $7.8B), stakes in >20 PE funds that it manages (worth $5.5B), and a portfolio of investment properties (worth $10.1B). These combined gives CLIM total assets of $23.4B. Reconciling this with the stated NAV of $14.8B, we can assume that the difference is due to working capital and debt.

CLIM would have an assets under management (“AUM”) of 132.5B and funds under management (“FUM”) of 77.6B. This makes CLIM the largest REIM in Asia and one of the top 10 globally. Management has guided for a target FUM of $100B by 2024.

Key Merits of REIMs vs Developers

CAPL has presented the deal as a way of unlocking value in the investment management arm, which has been undervalued by the market due to the asset heavy nature of the property development arm. As per CAPL’s investor presentation, Real Estate Investment Managers (REIMs) generally trade at higher multiples than Property Developers, due to REIMs having a more asset light model and more predictable recurring revenue. CAPL’s investor presentation stated that REIMs trade at an average of 2.6x P/NAV, while SG and HK developers (ex-CAPL) trade at an average of 0.6x P/NAV.  On a forward P/E basis, REIMs also trade at a premium as compared to developers. However, I believe that using P/E as a metric would be less relevant due to the inclusion of revaluation gains/losses, which would result in varying net profit over the years.  



Given that CLIM is illustratively valued at $2.823 per share, or 1.0x P/NAV, one might be inclined to conclude that this presents a huge upside for CLIM if REIMs are valued at 2.6x P/NAV. However, the crucial difference here is that CLIM holds a substantial number of investment properties on its balance sheet, including Ion Orchard, Galaxis and 79 Robinson, for a combined value of $10.1 billion on its balance sheet. Hence, it would not be appropriate to simply place a 2.6x P/NAV valuation on CLIM, as this would mean that we are overvaluing its investment properties. 

Fund Management is Extremely Lucrative

FUM has been growing at a CAGR of 15%, from 51B in 2017 to 78B in 2020. There was a huge increase in FUM from 2018 to 2019 due to the acquisition of Ascendas Singbridge. As mentioned earlier, CAPL’s management has a target of 100B FUM by 2024.



Over the past four years, average fee income/FUM rate was 40bps or 0.4%. In FY2020, CAPL earned fee income from Reits and Fund Management of $306 million. This fee income excludes fees from serviced residence management as well as property management, which would be included in CLIM’s revenue going forward. It is evident that the fund management business is extremely lucrative. A 56% EBITDA margin indicates strong profitability, and comparable to many leading companies including Facebook, Visa and MasterCard.

The caveat here would be that the Reit manager usually opts to receive Reit management fees in the form of both cash and units in the Reit, thus the earnings from the Fund Management arm would not entirely be in cash.

Dividends from the 6 Reits/Business Trust and Private Funds

CLIM would retain CAPL’s proportionate stake in the 6 Reits/Business Trust, which would entitle it to receive dividends distributed to shareholders. Based on CAPL’s shareholding percentage in the various Reits from its 2020 Annual Report and the current year’s DPU of the Reits, I estimated that the potential annual dividends that CLIM receives would be approximately $330 million. CLIM would also receive dividends from its proportionate stake in its private funds, but I believe that this information isn’t readily available.



Key Concerns

1. Dividend policy: As investors primarily invest in real estate companies for income, a key concern on that investors may have would be the dividend policy of CLIM, as there has yet to be clarity on this. However, I believe that CLIM would still provide investors with a reasonable dividend, because CLA (the development arm to be taken private) still holds a 51% stake in CLIM. As CLIM is the cash cow of CLA, the parent company would still require cashflow in the form of dividends, to fund its development activities. Hence, the most straightforward way would be for CLIM to distribute dividends to both CLA and other shareholders.

2. Downsides of being asset light: I think the more important question to ask would be regarding CLIM’s strategy in the event when its Reits undertake equity fund raisings. Currently, the Reit’s sponsor (CAPL in this case) would undertake to subscribe to its proportionate stake in the EFR exercise. Given the asset heavy nature of CAPL – with its substantial cash pile – CAPL definitely has the resources to subscribe for its proportionate stake in the EFR. However, as CLIM aims to be asset light, it would be beneficial if the management provides investors with clarity on their strategy going forward.

Do note that this aforementioned situation only arises if the Reit acquires properties from third parties or CLA. For example, if CICT does a $1 billion rights issue to fund acquisitions from a third party, CLIM would usually have to undertake to subscribe to its proportionate stake in the EFR. In this case, it would be approximately 23% of $1 billion, or $230 million that CLIM has to produce. In the event when the Reit acquires properties from CLIM, there would be no issue, as CLIM can fund its proportionate stake in the EFR from its proceeds from selling the property.

Conclusion

Investors would have to value CLIM on its earnings ability based on 1. Fund Management income, 2. Serviced Residence and Property Management fees, 3. Dividends from Reits and private funds and 4. Rental Income from Investment Properties. I have covered points 1 and 3, but am unable to find information on points 2 and 4.

Disclaimer: This article is intended for informational and discussion purposes only, and do not constitute financial advice. When in doubt, please contact a licensed financial adviser.

Note: After the publication of this report, I have bought shares of CAPL at an average price of $3.58. My positions my change from time to time without further any further updates. 


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